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Medallion Fund: The Ultimate Counterexample?
MedallionFund.pdf (12988 downloads )
Abstract: The performance of Renaissance Technologies’ Medallion fund provides the ultimate counterexample to the hypothesis of market efficiency. Over the period from the start of trading in 1988 to 2018, $100 invested in Medallion would have grown to $398.7 million, representing a compound return of 63.3%. Returns of this magnitude over such an extended period far outstrip anything reported in the academic literature. Furthermore, during the entire 31-year period, Medallion never had a negative return despite the dot.com crash and the financial crisis. Despite this remarkable performance, the fund’s market beta and factor loadings were all negative, so that Medallion’s performance cannot be interpreted as a premium for risk bearing. To date, there is no adequate rational market explanation for this performance.
In his book, The Man Who Solved the Market, Zuckerman (2019) describes how James Simon built his firm, Renaissance Technologies, and its premier fund, Medallion. For investment scholars and practitioners, the most interesting part of the book is Appendix 1 where Zuckerman provides Medallion’s performance data. That data is reproduced as Table 1 here. To say that the performance is extraordinary is to understate by an order of magnitude.
In this short note, I work with the gross returns because they reflect the value added by investment management. The net returns, which are still extraordinary, are reduced by the fees that management can charge for its skill. Ironically, despite the industry leading fees charged by Medallion, Mr. Simons concluded that outside investors should not be allowed in the fund and accounts of the original outside investors were closed. Later Renaissance did start new funds in which outsiders could invest. More on that below.
Turning to time series of gross returns, the results are unprecedented. In forty plus years of reading hundreds of papers on investment anomalies, including some that benefited from data snooping and ex-post selection bias, I have never seen any performance approaching that reported by Medallion. Over the course of the 31 years from 1988 through 2018, the fund never had a negative return. During the dot.com crash and the financial crisis Medallion’s returns were 56.6% and 74.6%, respectively. Following the first two years of operation, the lowest annual return was 31.5%
The most dramatic way to appreciate Medallion’s extraordinary performance is to calculate the growth of wealth. As shown in Table 2, $100 invested in the CRSP value weighted market at the start of 1988 would have grown to $1,910 by the end 2018 (assuming all proceeds are reinvested). That reflects a respectable compound return of 9.98%,
particularly considering that both the dot.com crash and the financial crisis occurred during the sample period. In comparison, $100 invested in Medallion at the start of 1988 would have grown to $398,723,873. It takes a while for the to sink in. In 31 years, Medallion would have turned a $100 investment into a $400 million fortune. For a further comparison, I calculated “perfect foresight” returns using both monthly and annual data for the CRSP index. The perfect foresight returns are the returns that would be earned by investing in the market whenever the subsequent return exceeded that on Treasury bills and buying Treasury bills when it did not. Using annual perfect foresight returns, the ending POW for the market jumps to $7,539 illustrating the benefits of foresight. Using monthly returns, it grows to a remarkable $331,288. As large as this is, it still less than 10% of the ending wealth produced by the same $100 investment in Medallion.
In fairness, the Medallion estimate in Table 2 overstate growth that could be achieved in the aggregate because there were times when the fund was not accepting new investments so that employees could not reinvest and other times when employees chose to withdraw their winnings. Had that not been the case, the series of returns implies that the original seed money would have grown to many trillions of dollars. Long before that, the size of funds under management would have limited returns. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that as the fund grew from $20 million to $10 billion, as shown in Table 1, the returns did not fall off. Apparently, the strategy was sufficiently robust that it could be scaled to $10 billion without affecting the returns.
As described by Zuckerman, Medallion’s strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short. According to Robert Mercer, one of Medallion’s key investment managers, Medallion was right on only about 50.75% of its trades. Nonetheless, he stated that taken over millions of trades that percentage allowed the firm to make billions. It is worth noting that engaging in millions of trades suggests that the transaction costs would be significant. The fact that the reported gross returns are after trading costs, makes Medallion’s performance even more extraordinary. It also implies that Renaissance was apparently particularly effective in minimizing such costs.
Returns of the level reported by Medallion could hardly be interpreted as risk premiums. In fact, it is difficult to speak of risk regarding Medallion because the fund never experienced a negative annual return. The fund did have a large standard deviation of returns, 31.7%, but that was around an arithmetic mean of 66.1%, implying a Sharpe ratio of exceeding 2.0. As to systematic risk, a regression of Medallion’s excess returns on the CRSP market index produces a beta of approximately -1.0 so that in addition to its extraordinary performance Medallion also offered a hedge against market risk. A three-factor regression adding the Fama and French (1996) variables SMB and HML reveals that loadings on both factors are also negative, though neither is statistically significant. Whatever the source of Medallion’s returns, it is not a reward for risk bearing.
Although Medallion is closed, Renaissance Technologies does have funds that are open to outside investors. The two primary ones are Renaissance Institutional Equities Fund and Renaissance Institutional Diversified Alpha. According to Zuckerman, however, neither follows the same strategy as Medallion. This is consistent with the fact that the returns on the funds have been relatively mundane and in no way comparable to Medallion. It suggests that there is a scale limit on whatever strategies have generated Medallion’s returns.
Unfortunately, this paper cannot offer a convincing explanation for Medallion’s performance. One possibility is that Medallion is simply a better market maker than any of its competitors and that over millions of trades that advantage translates into the observed returns. But the returns are so large, it stretches that explanation to the limit. Whatever the source of the performance, Medallion is a Michelson-Morley level challenge to the hypothesis of market efficiency. On that basis alone, it is worth further consideration.
References
Fama, Eugene and Kenneth R. French, 1996, Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies, Journal of Finance, 51, 55-84.
Zuckerman, Gregory, 2019, The Who Solved the Market, Penguin Random House, New York, NY
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[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] me that they very much seemed real. One is Brad Cornell, professor emeritus of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s profileHe told me in an email: “The only conclusion I can reach is that there are cases where things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
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[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when […]
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[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] that they very a lot seem like real. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he advised me in an e mail: “The one conclusion I might attain is that there are instances when […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] that they very a lot seem like real. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s file, he instructed me in an e-mail: “The one conclusion I might attain is that there are […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] they very much appear to be genuine. One is Brad Cornell, an emeritus professor of finance at UCLA. After analyzing Medallion’s record, he told me in an email: “The only conclusion I could reach is that there are cases when things […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway throughout the interval during which each have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, studies that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after charges) between 1988 and 2018, […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during a duration in that both have existed. Brad Cornell, a highbrow emeritus during UCLA, reports that Simons’ account constructed a 39.2% annualized lapse (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Fund has outperformed even Berkshire Hathaway during the period in which both have existed. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that Simons’ fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] Medallion Fund ส่วนตัวจาก Renaissance Technologies Brad Cornell ศาสตราจารย์กิตติคุณของ UCLA รายงา… ว่ากองทุนนี้ให้ผลตอบแทน 39.2% ต่อปี […]
[…] that I do know of was produced by the non-public Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Applied sciences. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after charges) between 1988 and 2018, in […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] return that I know of was produced by the private Medallion Fund, from Renaissance Technologies. Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that this fund produced a 39.2% annualized return (after fees) between 1988 and 2018, in contrast […]
[…] 13, 2021 submitted by /u/dect60 [link] […]
[…] Medallion Fund: Proof that markets are not efficient ( Cornell Capital) […]
[…] Medallion Fund: Proof that markets are not efficient ( Cornell Capital) […]
[…] invested in Medallion would have grown to $398.7 million, representing a compound return of 63.3%. (Cornell-capital) see also Why the Medallion Fund is the Greatest Money-Making Machine of All Time To put this […]
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[…] The Medallion fund has been restricted to just insiders since the end of 2005. Other folks are also getting curious about its lopsided results. Cornell Capital Group studied its performance and wrote the following eyebrow-raising analysis: […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, stories that the chances of success of any of Medallion Fund’s particular person trades have been 50.75%, solely barely increased than 50%. However when coupled with high-frequency buying and selling, these odds are sufficient to provide a extremely worthwhile technique. Medallion’s “technique concerned continuously opening and masking hundreds of short-term positions, each lengthy and quick… Taken over thousands and thousands of trades that [50.75%] share allowed the agency to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] Brad Cornell, a professor emeritus at UCLA, reports that the odds of success of any of Medallion Fund’s individual trades have been 50.75%, only slightly higher than 50%. But when coupled with high-frequency trading, those odds are enough to produce a highly profitable strategy. Medallion’s “strategy involved constantly opening and covering thousands of short-term positions, both long and short… Taken over millions of trades that [50.75%] percentage allowed the firm to make billions,” Cornell wrote. […]
[…] notorious failures of professional stock pickers who seek alpha. With a few interesting exceptions (the medallion fund is a fascinating, if non-replicable, case study), the rule has been evidenced by unbecoming data […]
[…] Quantitative investing has a proven track record of success. Many hedge funds and institutional investors have embraced quantitative approaches and achieved impressive returns. Consider showcasing some notable success stories and the strategies they employed. 1. Renaissance Technologies: The Medallion Fund, managed by Renaissance Technologies, has consistently delivered outstanding returns through quantitative trading strategies. You can read more about their approach here. […]
[…] Value as of year-end 2018 for a $100 investment at the start of 1998 in Medallion Fund. Source: Cornell Capital Group […]
[…] https://www.cornell-capital.com/blog/2020/02/medallion-fund-the-ultimate-counterexample.html […]
[…] This graphic shows the extraordinary performance of Simons’ flagship Medallion Fund in comparison to the S&P 500 over the same time period, based on data from Gregory Zuckerman’s The Man Who Solved the Market via Cornell Capital Group. […]
[…] or milliseconds. This ability allowed Renaissance’s flagship Medallion fund to enjoy a virtually unmatched 63.3% return from 1998 to […]
[…] former NSA employee in the early 1980s. Since 1988, their Medallion Fund has achieved an impressive average annual return of almost 40% after fees, making it one of the most successful hedge funds in […]
[…] former NSA employee in the early 1980s. Since 1988, their Medallion Fund has achieved an impressive average annual return of almost 40% after fees, making it one of the most successful hedge funds in […]
[…] Cornell Capital adapted from Gregory Zuckerman “The Man Who Solved the […]
[…] seconds or milliseconds. This ability allowed Renaissance’s flagship Medallion fund to enjoy a virtually unmatched 63.3% return from 1998 to […]
[…] algorithms since the 1980s to achieve unparalleled success, with their Medallion Fund posting an average annual return of nearly 40% since 1988. But the scenes have changed with the implementation of AI in […]
[…] or milliseconds. This ability allowed Renaissance’s flagship Medallion fund to enjoy a virtually unmatched 63.3% return from 1998 to […]